

Contingency Planning
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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

15 JUL 1969

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Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC
Active Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Dear General Cushman:

I appreciate your response to my letter regarding Admiral Hyland's overhead photography requirements for contingency planning.

The procedures which you outline to sanitize KH-4 photography for contingency planning on a case-by-case basis are adequate when crises can be predicted; they are inadequate to meet the quick response requirement of the fleet operating forces. For example, an attack carrier force must be prepared for near-instantaneous -almost reflex- reaction to a variety of crises occurring anywhere throughout a vast area. In such cases there just isn't the time or manpower available to prepare full descriptions of each target desired; to identify the contingency plan; and to prepare an inventory of available photography. Nor would there be time for the task force to wait for COMIREX evaluation and concurrence with such a request.

I am enclosing a proposal for sanitization and procedures responsive to fleet needs which has been prepared and forwarded to the Chairman of the appropriate COMIREX working group for deliberation on 11 July 1969. I would greatly appreciate your support in achieving early acceptance of this proposal.

I am passing a copy of this letter to the Director, DIA so that he may be aware of our efforts to improve support to the operating forces.

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Navy review(s) completed.

DIA review(s) completed.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, SANITIZATION AND DECONTROL WORKING GROUP

Subj: Sanitization/Decontrol of KH-4 Photography on Contingency Targets

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has received repeated requests from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet for authorization to modify the procedures for sanitizing and handling sanitized KH-4 photography. The two primary modifications requested are summarized as follows:

a. Allow sanitization of KH-4 photography on contingency targets without prior requests to DIA which require target identification and description, justification, listing of non-system photography available, etc.

b. Permit the distribution of sanitized photography in the form of miniature transparencies (MITRANS), rather than hard copy photo prints.

2. Concerning 1.a. above, the requirement to submit requests for sanitization of KH-4 photography of contingency targets on a case-by-case basis results in an inherent time delay plus additional workload for Fleet Intelligence Centers. With the assistance of DIA, somewhat streamlined procedures for the submission of these requests have been evolved; nevertheless, when considering the many contingency areas in the world, and the large number of targets involved, the time required for operational forces to achieve actual preparedness and the efforts involved on the part of intelligence support commands are excessive.

3. Concerning item 1.b. above, the procedures for handling sanitized KH-4 photography of contingency targets by operational forces is not in consonance or compatible with modern automated intelligence data base usage. The placing of individual target photo prints in SIOP folders is acceptable and efficient because of the uniqueness and limited number of these targets. Each Navy attack carrier, however, has within its Integrated Operational Intelligence Center (IOIC) an automated data base and miniaturized intelligence materials covering either the entire Atlantic or Pacific areas of operations. It was determined years ago that individual target folders on each target in every area of possible operations could not be stored or maintained on board ship. The automated miniaturized data base was therefore instituted, so that target materials on any area could be rapidly extracted and compiled into target folders to support any contingency. Photography covering such targets is in the form

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of MITRANS (supra), which consist of film transparencies the size of an ID card and on which two 2 1/4" x 2 1/4" photographs and an identification block are located. The photographs are high quality reductions which can be rapidly reproduced at original size. Both CINCUSNAVEUR and CINCPACFLT have requested that sanitized KH-4 photos be held on board CVA's in the MITRAN form, because of ease in production by Fleet Intelligence Centers and ability of handling on board ship. Following are some of the factors and details which should be considered in resolving whether or not MITRANS of sanitized KH-4 photography should be authorized for inclusion within IOIC automated data base:

a. Operational Responsiveness - MITRANS allow significantly more flexibility in a tactical situation which can not be easily or quickly accomplished by hard copy prints or target folders. Each attack carrier (CVA) in the Atlantic has in its IOIC data base hundreds of thousands of index cards, in card form and on magnetic tape, which refer to miniaturized intelligence data and materials also held on board ship, covering all areas contiguous to the entire Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Pacific based CVA's have similar holdings relating to the entire Pacific theatre. Thus every attack carrier has intelligence materials to support operations in any area within its theatre. For example, when a CVA is sent to the Caribbean because of a crisis in Haiti, the ship's IOIC can automatically search for, retrieve, and reproduce all intelligence and materials on Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and any other areas involved, and be ready for any actions required when the ship reaches its station. Upon departure from that area, the reproduced materials are destroyed, and preparations are made to ready the ship for the next area of operations. In many regions, however, photography held in the IOIC is extremely outdated, and operational capabilities, both offensive and defensive, would be severely hampered until tactical reconnaissance could be conducted by the ship's aircraft.

b. Economics - The production of MITRANS by the Fleet Intelligence Centers, which support the CVA's with intelligence materials, is both faster and less expensive in terms of man hours and money. MITRANS can be produced at the rate of 3000 per day, with no degrading of other photo production at Fleet Intelligence Centers, and new production techniques reduce the cost of a MITRAN to one eighth that of a photo print. The packaging, shipping, and storing of MITRANS are all cheaper and more efficient because of the reduced size.

c. Security - The accountability and continuing control of MITRANS is more positive than that of photo prints because of the automated card indexing and sequential numbering and filing system used by the IOIC. At the same time, a large number of MITRANS is held on board ship, so that even a substantial number of sanitized KH-4 photos would comprise a small percentage of the MITRAN file, and a minute portion of the entire IOIC data base. Concerning physical security and the possibility of compromise, the

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Intelligence Centers on attack carriers are controlled spaces. Only Top Secret cleared personnel have access to the Centers, and material control is absolutely positive. There are many classified documents which are never removed from the IOIC; and the sanitized KH-4 photos now held are in this category. MITRANS and reproductions of MITRANS would certainly be in this category. Considering the rigid control exercised within the IOIC and the limited number of people involved, the possibility of compromising such materials would be much more remote on an attack carrier than under the TK handling procedures in Washington where personnel having access number in the thousands.

4. In summary, it is believed that the recommendations to authorize (a) the sanitization of KH-4 photography of contingency targets as deemed necessary without the requirement of submitting requests for each target, and (b) the production of sanitized KH-4 photography in the form of miniature transparencies (MITRANS) for use on board attack carriers, would allow deployed Naval forces to be prepared for any contingency at no increased risk to the security of classified material or the TK system.

Very respectfully,

James A. RICHARDSON
Navy Member
SDWG

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State SDWG Member
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